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Abstract 
 
It is well established that context plays a fundamental role in how we learn and use language. 
Here we explore how context links short-term language use with the long-term emergence of 
different types of language systems. Using an iterated learning model of cultural 
transmission, the current study experimentally investigates the role of the communicative 
situation in which an utterance is produced (SITUATIONAL CONTEXT) and how it influences 
the emergence of three types of linguistic systems: UNDERSPECIFIED languages (where only 
some dimensions of meaning are encoded linguistically), HOLISTIC systems (lacking 
systematic structure) and SYSTEMATIC languages (consisting of compound signals encoding 
both category-level and individuating dimensions of meaning). To do this, we set up a 
discrimination task in a communication game and manipulated whether the feature dimension 
shape was relevant or not in discriminating between two referents. The experimental 
languages gradually evolved to encode information relevant to the task of achieving 
communicative success, given the situational context in which they are learned and used, 
resulting in the emergence of different linguistic systems. These results suggest language 
systems adapt to their contextual niche over iterated learning. 
 
1) Introduction 
One of the fundamental axioms of modern cognitive-functional linguistics is that "[word] 
meaning is highly context-sensitive, and thus mutable" (Evans, 2005: 71). When interpreting 
a particular utterance, language users must not only rely on the meaning encoded in linguistic 
forms, but also on what they infer from contextual information. Such notions were explicitly 
acknowledged in the early work of Grice (1957), with a distinction being made between 
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SIGNAL MEANING
1 and CONTEXTUAL MEANING (Evans & Green, 2006). Signal meaning 
refers to the senses stored in semantic memory, forming part of the user's linguistic 
knowledge. Contextual meaning is constructed on-line and constitutes an extension of the 
original signal meaning through an individual's inferential capacities (cf. Evans & Green, 
2006; Hoefler, 2009: 6). Put simply: “[...] some meaning is encoded in linguistic forms and 
some is inferred” (Wedgwood, 2007: 652). 
 
In this sense, context broadly refers to the set of premises used in interpreting an utterance, 
besides the information already specified in the signal meaning, and constitutes a 
psychological construct that comprises a subset of an individual's assumptions about the 
world (Sperber & Wilson, 1986: 15-16)2. Consider the word MOLE. Besides referring to a 
small burrowing animal, MOLE can also denote a form of espionage, a type of birthmark and 
a unit in chemistry. Each of these senses are said to be stored in semantic memory, with their 
use and interpretation being governed by the very specific contexts in which they occur. 
Viewed in isolation words such as MOLE might be construed as communicatively 
dysfunctional. Yet, in context, it is typically easy to distinguish one sense from another. 
Having specific knowledge of the context thus enables a hearer to change their expectations 
regarding the intended meaning of a given word. In other words, when the context is known 
and informative, it necessarily decreases uncertainty (Piantadosi, Tily & Gibson, 2012). 
 
As context is used as a resource to reduce uncertainty, it might alter our conception of how an 
optimal communication system should be structured (Zipf, 1949; Piantadosi, Tily & Gibson, 
2012). Levinson (2000: 29), for instance, argues that our cognitive abilities favour 
                                                 
1 We use signal meaning to refer to what Evans & Green (2006) refer to as encyclopaedic meaning. 
2 This can refer to the wider sentential context in which a word is embedded as well as the situational and 
interpersonal contexts that make up the salient common ground, among others (see: Bach, 2012; Evans & 
Green, 2006: 221). 
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communication systems which are skewed in their design towards hearer inference over 
speaker effort. Meanwhile, Pinker & Bloom (1990) note language exhibits design for 
communication because it allows for "minimising ambiguity in context" (pg. 713, emphasis 
added). Evidence for the role of context is also apparent in the way we structure our 
utterances, with syntax being sensitive to the wider discourse and the immediate 
communicative needs of interlocutors (Chafe, 1976; DuBois, 1987; Fery & Krifka, 2008). 
Furthermore, these immediate communicative needs can give rise to longer-term patterns: 
here, the way in which speakers pragmatically design utterances (INVITED INFERENCES, 
Traugott & Konig, 1991), as well as how hearers interpret utterances (CONTEXT-INDUCED 
INTERPRETATION, Heine, Claudi & Hunnemeyer, 1991), is posited to play a fundamental role 
in historical processes, such as grammaticalization (cf. Traugott & Trousdale, 2013). 
 
There are a number of different kinds of context we could talk about in relation to a particular 
usage event (Evans & Green, 2006; Bach, 2012). Our present study is specifically focused on 
the SITUATIONAL CONTEXT: the immediate communicative environment in which an 
utterance is situated (Evans & Green, 2006: 221) and how it influences the distinctions a 
speaker needs to convey. In an experimental setting, situational context can be manipulated 
by tailoring both the types of stimuli and the way in which they are organised. For example, 
in a study examining how adjectives were used in referring expressions, Sedivy (2005) 
discovered that speakers were more likely to use an adjective when one object shared a 
feature dimension with another object (e.g., a blue cup and green cup), but not when the 
object belonged to a different category (e.g., a cup and a teddy bear). Similarly, Ferreira, 
Slevc & Rodgers (2005) found that when speakers were faced with conceptual ambiguities, 
such as having to discriminate between two types of bat (the flying mammal), they would 
disambiguate on a relevant dimension (e.g., using the small bat in their utterance rather than 
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just the bat when a large bat was also present in the context), whereas when speakers were 
presented with linguistic ambiguities (e.g., a baseball bat and an animal bat) they were less 
likely to engage in ambiguity avoidance.   
 
If the situational context plays a fundamental role in how language is structured, then the 
general observation that some meaning is encoded and some is inferred leaves open the 
questions: (i) To what extent does the situational context influence the encoding of features in 
the linguistic system? (ii) How does the effect of the situational context work its way into the 
structure of language? To help answer these questions we investigate how situational context 
influences the emergence of linguistic systems. Using an artificial language paradigm, we 
experimentally simulate cultural transmission in a pair-based communication game setup (cf. 
Scott-Phillips & Kirby, 2010; Galantucci, Garrod & Roberts, 2012). Participants learn an 
artificial language which provides labels for a set of pictures, ‘meanings’ to be 
communicated. These stimuli vary on the dimension of shape, with each referent also having 
a unique, idiosyncratic element. After learning the language, participants play a series of 
communication games with their partner, taking turns to describe pictures for each other. We 
modified the situational context in which communication took place by manipulating whether 
the feature dimension of shape was relevant or not for a discrimination task: for example, 
some participants would encounter only situational contexts in which the objects to be 
discriminated during communication differed in shape, whereas others would be confronted 
with contexts in which the objects to be discriminated during communication were of the 
same shape. Finally, these pairs of participants were arranged into transmission chains 
(Kirby, Cornish & Smith, 2008; Scott-Phillips & Kirby, 2010; Thiesen-White, Kirby & 
Oberlander, 2011), such that the language produced during communication by the nth pair in 
a chain became the language that the n+1th pair attempted to learn. This method allows us to 
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investigate how the artificial languages change and evolve as they are adapted to meet the 
participants’ communicative needs and/or as they are passed from individual to individual via 
learning. We predict that languages in different types of situational context will adapt to 
become optimally structured as follows: 
 When the feature dimension of shape always differs between pairs of referents which 
are to be discriminated, we predict that the languages will evolve to only encode 
shape in the linguistic signal, and become underspecified on all other dimensions. 
 When the feature dimension of shape is always shared between pairs of referents 
which are to be discriminated, we predict that a holistic systems will emerge, in which 
each referent is associated with an idiosyncratic label that encodes that referent’s 
idiosyncratic feature; 
 When the feature dimension of shape sometimes differs and is sometimes shared 
within pairs of referents, we predict that the languages will become systematically 
structured to encode both the shape (via a category marker) and idiosyncratic features 
(via an individuating element of the signal).  
 
1.1 Iterated Learning and Communication Games: A method for investigating the 
emergence and evolution of language 
Language is not only a conveyer of cultural information, but is itself a socially learned and 
culturally transmitted system, with an individual's linguistic knowledge being the result of 
observing and reconstructing the linguistic behaviour of others (Kirby & Hurford, 2002). This 
process can be explored experimentally using ITERATED LEARNING: a cycle of continued 
production and induction where individual learners are exposed to a set of data, which they 
must then reproduce and pass on to the next generation of learners (Kirby, Cornish & Smith, 
2008). 
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Using this method, researchers have demonstrated that cultural transmission can account for 
the emergence of some design features in language, including ARBITRARINESS (Thiesen-
White, Kirby & Oberlander, 2011; Caldwell & Smith, 2012), REGULARITY (Reali & 
Griffiths, 2009; Smith & Wonnacott, 2010), DUALITY OF PATTERNING (Verhoef, 2012) and 
SYSTEMATIC COMPOSITIONAL STRUCTURE (Kirby et al., 2008; Theisen-White et al., 2011). 
Typically, a participant is trained on a target system (e.g., an artificial language) and then 
tested on their ability to reproduce what they have learned, with the test output being used as 
the training input for the next participant in a chain. 
 
These studies show that cultural transmission can account for the emergence of structure in 
communication systems. In particular, communication systems adapt to constraints inherent 
in the learning process: domain-general limitations in our memory and processing capabilities 
(Christiansen & Chater, 2008) introduce a LEARNABILITY PRESSURE (Brighton, Kirby & 
Smith, 2005), meaning that languages that are difficult to learn tend not to be accurately 
reproduced, and therefore change. Recent work in this paradigm shows that the incorporation 
of situational context can change the extent to which the evolving language encodes certain 
features of referents. Silvey, Kirby & Smith (2014) show, using a transmission chain 
paradigm, that word meanings evolve to selectively preserve distinctions which are salient 
during word learning. Using a pseudo-communicative task, where participants needed to 
discriminate between a target meaning and a distractor meaning, the authors were able to 
manipulate which meaning dimensions (SHAPE, COLOUR and MOTION) were relevant and 
irrelevant in conveying the intended meaning. If a meaning dimension was backgrounded, in 
that it was not relevant in distinguishing between the target and distractor, then the languages 
evolved not to encode this particular meaning dimension. Instead, the languages converged 
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on underspecified systems based on the relevant feature dimensions for discriminating 
between meanings.  
 
However, language is not merely a task of passively remembering and reproducing a set of 
form-meaning pairings. Language is also a process of JOINT ACTION (Bratman, 1992; Clark, 
1996; Croft, 2000): that is, language is fundamentally a social and interactional phenomenon, 
whereby the role of usage, communication and coordination are salient pressures on the 
system (also see: Tomasello, 2008; Bybee, 2010). Experimental communication games have 
been used to investigate the emergence of combinatorial (Galantucci, Kroos & Rhodes, 2010) 
and compositional (Selten & Warglein, 2007) structure, the emergence of arbitrary symbols 
from iconic signs (Garrod, Fay, Lee, Oberlander & MacLeod, 2007), and how common 
ground influences the extent to which a communication can become established in the first 
place (Scott-Phillips, Kirby & Ritchie, 2009). 
 
Converging evidence from iterated learning and communication games point to both learning 
and communication as powerful forces in shaping the structure of language (Smith, Tamariz 
& Kirby, 2013; Fay & Ellison, 2013). With this in mind, the basic premise of the current 
experiment is to expend upon this work by: (a) adding a communicative element to the 
experimental setup of Silvey, Kirby & Smith (2014), and (b) manipulating the types of 
situational context. 
 
1.2 The Problem of Linkage: Language Strategies and the emergence of language systems 
Explaining how context works its way into the structure of language requires that we consider 
the PROBLEM OF LINKAGE (Kirby, 1999; Kirby, 2012). Rather than there being a 
straightforward link between our individual cognitive machinery and the features we observe 
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in language, we are instead faced with an additional dynamical system: SOCIO-CULTURAL 
TRANSMISSION. Treating language as a COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEM (Beckner et al., 2009; 
Cornish, Tamariz & Kirby, 2009) solves this problem of linkage because we can consider 
how short-term LANGUAGE STRATEGIES (Evans & Green, 2006: 110) used in solving 
immediate communicative needs can give rise to LANGUAGE SYSTEMS through long-term 
patterns of learning and use (Bleys & Steels, 2009; Steels, 2012; Beuls & Steels, 2013). 
 
The language strategy a speaker selects to enable a listener to identify their intended meaning 
is dependent not only on the referential information available, but also the context in which 
the utterance is situated. Take the relatively simple communicative situation in Figure 1: here, 
there are several language strategies that a language user could employ to convey the 
intended meaning. In context 1A, the intended meaning can easily be conveyed by using the 
label DOG as opposed to CAT. If, however, the situational context pairs the intended referent 
with another dog (as in context 1B), then it makes little sense to use the referential label of 
DOG, as the listener is very unlikely to be able to distinguish between the two referents on the 
basis of that label. Instead, other strategies must be employed, such as providing a unique 
identifier that is more specialised (DALMATIAN) or creating a compound signal (Ay, Flack & 
Krakauer, 2007) that has both specialised and generalised components (SPOTTED DOG). 
 
[Figure One goes here] 
 
The current experiment explores how these short-term strategies of achieving communicative 
success in a situational context influence the emergence of different types of language 
systems. In particular, we focus on the evolution of three types of language systems: 
UNDERSPECIFIED, HOLISTIC and SYSTEMATIC. Underspecification captures the observation 
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that languages abstract across referents by encoding some feature dimensions and ignoring 
others (Silvey, Kirby & Smith, 2014). Using the examples above, the word DOG is 
underspecified with respect to whether or not its referent is spotted or brown. Conversely, the 
labels DALMATIAN, POODLE, SIAMESE and TABBY are holistic, in that they embody an 
arbitrary set of one-to-one mappings between signals and their meanings3: holistic signals 
serve the purpose of individuation (Lyons, 1977). Finally, in a systematic mapping between 
forms and meanings the signals share elements of form (unlike in a holistic mapping, where 
each signal is unrelated to the other signals) but are nonetheless one-to-one: systematic 
languages consist of compound signals (e.g., SPOTTED DOG), whereby part of the structure 
refers to a general-level category (e.g., DOG) and part of the structure refers to an 
individuating component (e.g., SPOTTED). 
 
To test for the effect of situational context, we use a GUESSING GAME setup (cf. Steels, 2003; 
Silvey, Kirby & Smith, 2014): the task is to discriminate between pairings of a target object 
and a distractor object. In our case, possible referents are drawn from a set of images which 
vary in shape (see Figure 2 below). Manipulating these pairings gives us three experimental 
conditions based on: (a) whether the feature dimension of shape is relevant or not in 
discriminating between two referents, and (b) the extent to which stimuli pairings remain 
consistent over time with respect to the relevance of the feature dimension of shape. 
 
[Figure Two goes here] 
 
 
                                                 
3It should be noted that these holistic labels are also underspecified in respect to other possible signals (e.g., 
dalmatian puppy, spotted dalmatian). The important point to keep in mind is the relevance of dimension we are 
trying to signal. In this case, the signal dog is underspecified when compared with dalmatian and poodle. We 
could also highlight instances where dog is more specific than other signals, such as animal. Such notions are 
widely acknowledged in any linguistic theory that takes into account hierarchical relations between referents. 
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In the SHAPE-DIFFERENT condition, pairings of target and distractor are constructed such that 
the feature dimension of shape is always relevant with respect to discrimination, i.e. target 
and distractor differ in shape. Since the two objects in such situational contexts have different 
shapes, then they can be discriminated merely by referring to shape. We therefore predict that 
the languages in the Shape-Different condition will evolve to become underspecified, 
specifying shape but not differentiating between the objects within a given shape category: 
such an underspecified system is functionally adequate for achieving communicative success 
in this situational context, and is highly learnable (Kirby, Cornish & Smith, 2008). 
Conversely, in the SHAPE-SAME condition target and distractor are always of the same shape 
– differing only on their idiosyncratic features. Consequently, the feature dimension of shape 
is always irrelevant in discrimination, and therefore does not need to be specified 
linguistically, with abstracting across referents of the same shape being communicatively 
dysfunctional for these situational contexts. We therefore predict that holistic systems will 
emerge in the Shape-Same condition, where each individual referent is associated with a 
unique label that maps onto its idiosyncratic feature. Lastly, for the MIXED condition we 
manipulated the predictability of situational contexts across trials: on some trials target and 
distractor share the same shape and on others they differ in shape. When encountering this 
mix of situational contexts, we hypothesise languages will become systematically structured, 
encoding in the linguistic signal both the basic-level of shape and individuating information 
of the idiosyncratic feature. Furthermore, we expect that the labels for the basic-level feature 
will becomes conventionalised earlier than those specifying the individuating information, 
with participants attempting to meet their immediate communicative needs on a piecemeal 
basis, through minimising effort and maximising communicative success; the quickest way to 
achieve this would be for participants to first align on conventional forms for two shapes (as 
this minimises effort and will ensure communicative success in contexts where shape is 
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relevant in discrimination) followed by conventional forms for the eight idiosyncratic 
features (as these are needed to make these distinctions in contexts where shape is irrelevant 
in discrimination).  
 
1.3 Ecologically-Sensitive, Learning Bias and Historically Contingent Accounts 
Our prediction that manipulations to the situational context will bias the probability of one 
linguistic system emerging over another is consistent with a broader class of predictions that 
we will term ECOLOGICALLY-SENSITIVE accounts. Under this perspective, languages adapt to 
the structure of their niche in an analogous manner to that of biological organisms: just as 
environmental niches constrain and guide the evolution of species, so too are socio-cultural 
niches salient constraints on the types of languages that emerge (Lupyan & Dale, 2010). The 
ecologically-sensitive account is consistent with a range of observations including: that social 
structure patterns with differences in language structure (Wray & Grace, 2007; Lupyan & 
Dale, 2010); that word frequency is a product of the range of individuals and topics 
(Altmann, Pierrehumbert & Motter, 2011); that interactional constraints and conversational 
infrastructure lead to cultural convergence of linguistic form (Dingemanse, Torreira & 
Enfield, 2013); that objects and events in the world guide word learning discrimination 
(Ramscar, Yarlett, Dye, Denny & Thorpe, 2010); that word length patterns with the 
complexity of the meaning space (Lewis, Sugarman & Frank, 2014); that the structure of 
languages is shaped by the structure of meanings to be communicated (Perfors & Narravo, 
2014).  
 
These ecologically-sensitive accounts can be contrasted with two other theoretical 
perspectives that make different predictions about the relationship between the situational 
context and the emergence of linguistic systems. The first of these is the LEARNING BIAS 
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approach. This makes the prediction that language structure is closely coupled to the prior 
expectations and biases of language learners (e.g. Griffiths & Kalish, 2007; Reali & Griffiths, 
2009; Fedzechkina, Jaeger & Newport, 2012; Culbertson, Smolensky & Wilson, 2013; 
Culbertson & Adger, 2014). The learning bias approach can be further contrasted with what 
we term the HISTORICAL CONTINGENCY account, which holds that the types of systems that 
emerge are primarily constrained by random historical events, subtly biasing the language in 
one direction or another. When compared with the ecologically-sensitive and the learning 
bias accounts, a historical contingency prediction is that language structure is the result of 
lineage-specific outcomes (Lass, 1997), with “the current state of a linguistic system shaping 
and constraining future states” (Dunn et al. 2011: 1). 
 
In their extreme incarnations, the learning bias and historical contingency accounts both 
predict that manipulating the situational context will have little effect on the types of systems 
that emerge in our experiment. For a learning bias account we would predict considerable 
convergence across all experimental conditions: there will be a globally-optimal solution in 
terms of a prior constraint (or set of constraints), with the languages then converging towards 
this prior. By contrast, the historical contingency account would predict a much higher degree 
of variation in the types of systems that eventually emerge, with the states of these systems 
being better predicted by individual variation and lineages than by either contextual or prior 
cognitive constraints. 
 
 
2 Method 
 
2.1 Participants 
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72 undergraduate and graduate students at the University of Edinburgh (42 female, median 
age 22) were recruited via the SAGE careers database and randomly assigned into 12 
diffusion chains. Each chain consisted of a pair of initial participants who learned a random 
language, and two pairs of successive participants who learned the previous pair of 
participants' output language, making 3 generations in total. These chains were further 
subdivided into three experimental conditions (see §2.3).     
 
2.2 Stimuli: Images and Target Language 
 
Participants were asked to learn and then produce an alien language, consisting of lowercase 
labels paired with images. The images were drawn from a set of 8 possible pictures, which 
varied on the dimension of shape (4 blobs and 4 stars), with each individual image also 
having 1 unique, idiosyncratic subordinate element (see Figure 2).  
 
The training language for the first participant pair in each chain was created as follows. From 
a set of vowels (a,e,i,o,u) and consonants (g,h,k,l,m,n,p,w) we randomly generated 9 CV 
syllables which we then used to randomly generate a set of 24 2-4 syllable words. These 
parameters ensured that there were 3 unique labels for every picture. Each chain was 
initialised with a different random language. The training language for later pairs of 
participants consisted of the language produced by the previous participant pair while 
communicating (see below). 
 
2.3 Procedure: Training Phase and Communication Phase 
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At the start of the experiment, participants were told they would first have to learn and then 
communicate using an alien language. Participants completed the experiment in separate 
booths on networked computers. The experiment consisted of two main phases: a TRAINING 
PHASE and a COMMUNICATION PHASE. Before each phase began, participants were given 
detailed information on what that phase would involve and were explicitly told not to use 
English or any other language they knew during the experiment4. For the training phase, 
participants were trained separately, and it was only during the communication phase that 
they interacted (remotely, over the computer network). 
 
2.3.1 Training Phase 
 
In each training trial, the participant was presented with a label and two images, one of which 
was the target and one a distractor. The participant was told that the alien wanted them to 
pick which of the two images corresponded to the label. Once the participant had selected an 
image (by clicking on it using the mouse) they were told whether their choice was correct or 
incorrect, shown the label and target image for 2 seconds, and then instructed to retype the 
label before proceeding to the next trial. Both targets and distractors were presented in a 
random order within the following constraints: (i) the pairing of target and distractor varied 
based on the experimental condition (see §2.4 below for more details on the conditions); (ii) 
within each training block, each of the 8 meanings appeared three times as a target. The 
training phase of the experiment consisted of 4 such blocks, each of 24 trials; each block 
contained the same 24 training trails, with the order of these trials being randomly shuffled. 
 
                                                 
4 Compliance with the instructions was high – to our knowledge participants did not make use of English or any 
other language in the current experiment. 
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2.3.2 Communication Phase 
 
During the communication phase of the experiment, participants took alternating turns as 
director and matcher: 
 
 DIRECTOR: As directors, participants were presented with two images: a target and a 
distractor. Targets were highlighted with a green border. The director was prompted 
to type a label that would best communicate the target to the matcher. The label was 
then sent to the matcher’s computer. 
 MATCHER: Participants were presented with the same two images as the director, 
with the label provided by the director appearing underneath. The matcher was then 
prompted to click on the image they thought corresponded to the label provided. 
 
Following each trial, participants were given feedback as to whether or not the matcher had 
correctly identified the picture described by the director, followed by a display showing the 
image the director was referring to and the image the matcher selected. Target and distractor 
pairings were randomly generated within the constraints imposed by the experimental 
conditions (see §2.4 below), and communication trials were presented in random order. The 
communication phase consisted of 2 blocks, the length of each block varied depending on the 
experimental condition (see below). 
 
2.4 Manipulating Context: Mixed, Shape-Same and Shape-Different Conditions 
 
To test the role of context, a simple manipulation was made to the possible combinations of 
target and distractor images within a single trial during training and communication. This 
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provides three experimental conditions. For the Shape-Same condition, participants only ever 
saw pairings of images that shared the same shape, but differed in their idiosyncratic element 
(see Figure 3A). In the Shape-Different condition, participants were exposed to pairings of 
images that differed in both their shape and idiosyncratic features (see Figure 3B). 
Participants in the Mixed condition encountered a mixture of image pairings: some image 
pairings shared the same shape but differed on their idiosyncratic features, whereas other 
image pairings differed on both their shape and idiosyncratic features (see Figure 3C). 
 
[Figure Three goes here] 
 
In the Mixed condition, one communication block contained 56 trials, with 24 trials 
consisting of pairs of images that shared the same basic-level category but differed on 
subordinate-level features (24 trials exhausting all such possible pairings), whereas the 
remaining 32 trials differed on both their basic-level category and subordinate-level features 
(again, 32 trials covering all such possible pairings). To ensure that Shape-Different and 
Shape-Same conditions were comparable to the Mixed condition in the number of trials, we 
doubled up the possible combinations of images in the other two conditions, i.e., the Shape-
Different condition involved 64 trials (32x2) per communication block and the Shape-Same 
condition involved 48 trials (24x2) per communication block; participants underwent two 
such blocks of communication. 
 
2.5 Iteration 
 
The labels produced by a pair of participants in the second block of the communication 
phase, and their associated target and distractor images, were used to construct the training 
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language for the next pair of participants: we simply randomly sampled from the 
communicative output of generation n to produce the training language for generation n+1, 
(see Figure 4).  
 
[Figure Four goes here] 
 
The random sampling process was constrained in the following ways. First, for all three 
conditions, we had a bottleneck on the number of signals that could be passed onto the next 
generation, i.e., for a single meaning we could only pass on three labels. As such, the number 
of signals transmitted from the final communication block of a generation stayed consistent 
between conditions, but the size of the sampling space differed slightly: Mixed (24/56 signals 
sampled), Shape-Different (24/64 signals sampled), Shape-Same (24/48 signals sampled). 
Second, in the Mixed condition, the random selection process was additionally constrained so 
that a given stimuli would appear in at least one shape-same context and one shape-different 
context, and that that there were an equal number (12) of shape-same and shape-different 
contexts in total. This meant that, in the Mixed condition, individual stimuli might appear in 
different ratios of shape-same and shape-different contexts. By contrast, the Shape-Same 
condition contained all possible pairings of target and distractor in training, and the Shape-
Different condition had a subset of all possible contexts (24 out of 32 possible stimuli pairs). 
 
2.6 Dependent Variables and Hypotheses 
 
2.6.1 Measuring Communicative Success 
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To measure communicative success we simply recorded the number of successful 
interactions, where the matcher clicked on the target image. Given the differing trial numbers, 
the maximum success score differs across conditions: Shape-Different (128 points for two 
blocks of 64 interactions), Mixed (112 points for two blocks of 56 interactions) and Shape-
Same (96 points for two blocks of 48 interactions). These maximum scores are converted into 
proportions to allow visual comparison between the three conditions, but the statistical 
analyses are conducted on the binary dependent variable. 
 
2.6.2 Measuring Language Types: Difference Scores 
 
In addition to conducting qualitative analyses of the languages that are produced during 
communication, we used the Normalised Levenshtein edit distance5 to provide objective 
measures for WITHIN-CATEGORY DIFFERENCE and BETWEEN-CATEGORY DIFFERENCE. To 
compute within-category difference for a given block, all labels associated with objects of a 
given category were compared with one another (i.e., all labels for the 4 blob-shaped images 
are paired with one another and given a total normalised Levenshtein edit distance, as were 
all labels for the 4 star-shaped images); the resulting pair of scores  (a score for the blob-
shaped category and a score for the star-shaped category) were then averaged to obtain a 
composite within-category difference score. Between-category difference was calculated for 
a given block by pairing all 4 labels for blobs with all 4 labels for star-shaped images at the 
same block and calculating average normalised Levenshtein distance. 
 
                                                 
5 The Normalised Levenshtein edit distance is calculated by taking the minimum number of edits (insertions, 
deletions, or substitutions of a single character) needed to transform one label into another, and then dividing by 
the length of the longer label.  
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These two difference scores provide us with an objective measure of language type.  In 
particular, holistic, systematic and underspecified languages are discriminable on these 
scores, primarily the within-category difference scores. A holistic language only encodes the 
idiosyncratic feature of objects in the linguistic system – shape category distinctions are not 
encoded. As such, we should expect the within-category and between-category differences to 
be similar. As a systematic language encodes both the shape category and the idiosyncratic 
element, systematic languages should exhibit smaller within-category difference scores than 
between-category difference scores, and should also exhibit lower within-category difference 
scores than holistic languages. For an underspecified language, we expect that only shape 
category information will be encoded, leading to substantial differences in within-category 
and between-category difference scores, with within-category scores being close to 0.  
 
2.6.3 Measuring Uncertainty: Conditional Entropy 
 
To further assist in quantifying the language types that emerge, we can calculate the degree of 
uncertainty in the system, which allows us to quantify the relationship between signals and 
their associated meaning. First, we need to operationalise two types of uncertainty about 
signal-meaning pairs. SIGNAL UNCERTAINTY arises from one-to-many pairings of meanings-
to-signals (as in cases of synonymy in natural language). Conversely, MEANING 
UNCERTAINTY arises from one-to-many pairings of signals-to-meanings (as in cases of 
homonymy and polysemy in natural languages6). We predict that the languages in all three 
conditions will evolve over cultural transmission to lower their signal uncertainty: that is, as a 
system becomes more conventionalised, it is more likely to only have one signal for each 
                                                 
6 We recognise there is a distinction between ambiguity, vagueness and polysemy in the lexical semantics and 
cognitive linguistics literature (cf. Tuggy, 1993; Geeraerts, 1993). For the sake of convenience, we use meaning 
uncertainty or ambiguity to simply refer to a one-to-many mapping of signals and meanings. 
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meaning (cf. Reali & Griffiths, 2009). The Mixed and Shape-Same conditions are predicted 
to evolve toward a one-to-one mapping between signals and meanings (i.e. we should see 
eight signals for eight meanings in these conditions), leading to low meaning uncertainty. 
However, the Shape-Different condition is predicted to show higher levels of meaning 
uncertainty: the prediction is that these chains should involve one-to-many signal-meaning 
pairs, as an underspecified system leads to the same label being associated with multiple 
objects which share the relevant feature (here, shape).  
 
To quantify signal uncertainty and meaning uncertainty we measure two aspects of the 
CONDITIONAL ENTROPY of the system. This gives us a measure of predictability that we can 
apply to both meaning uncertainty and signal uncertainty. H(M|S) is the expected entropy 
(i.e. uncertainty) over meanings given a signal, and therefore captures meaning uncertainty, 
H(𝑀|𝑆) =  − ∑ 𝑃(𝑠) ∑ 𝑃(𝑚|𝑠) 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃(𝑚|𝑠)
𝑚∈𝑀𝑠∈𝑆
 
where the rightmost sum is simply the entropy over meanings given a particular signal s∈S. 
P(m|s) is the probability that meaning, m is the intended meaning given that signal s has been 
produced. This entropy is weighted by a distribution P(s) on signals. We can also reverse the 
position of signals and meanings in this equation to get the conditional entropy of H(S|M), 
i.e., a  measure of signal uncertainty: 
H(𝑆|𝑀) =  − ∑ 𝑃(𝑚) ∑ 𝑃(𝑠|𝑚) 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃(𝑠|𝑚).
𝑠∈𝑆𝑚∈𝑀
 
 
 
High H(M|S) means that a signal is highly uninformative about the intended meaning (due to 
the signal having multiple meanings), whilst a high H(S|M) means that a meaning is highly 
uninformative about the intended signal (due to the meaning having multiple signals).  
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While these measures capture relevant aspects of the structure of the evolving languages, they 
do not take context into account, and therefore do not capture the functional adequacy of the 
system for communication in context. To account for the contextual meaning we incorporate 
one last measure meaning uncertainty in context, H(M|S, C), 
H(𝑀|𝑆, 𝐶) =  − ∑ 𝑃(𝑠, 𝑐) ∑ 𝑃(𝑚|𝑠, 𝑐) 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃(𝑚|𝑠, 𝑐)
𝑚∈𝑀𝑠,𝑐∈𝑆,𝐶
 
 
where the various sums are over signals and meanings GIVEN A CONTEXT. This measure 
captures the (potential) communicative utility of a system: we predict that the degree of in-
context meaning uncertainty will decrease in all three conditions (the languages will be 
functionally adequate for conveying the correct/intended meaning), whereas meaning 
uncertainty (disregarding context) will differ across conditions depending on the emerging 
linguistic systems, as discussed above. As such, we are able to compare these two measures 
to provide an accurate account of how these types of systems are evolving over time, and 
whether or not they are adapting to their situational contexts. 
 
2.6.4 Mixed Effects Model Overview 
 
We used R (R Core Team, 2013) and lme4 (Bates, Maechler & Bolker, 2012) to perform 
several separate linear mixed effects analyses based on the dependent variables of (a) 
communicative success, (b) within-category difference scores, (c) between-category 
difference scores, (d) H(S|M), (e) H(M|S) and (f) H(M|S,C). For our independent variables, 
we entered condition (Mixed, Shape-Same and Shape-Different), generation and block as 
fixed effects with interactions. As random effects, we had random intercepts for chain and 
participant, as well as chain and participant random slopes for generation and block. Each of 
these models used the Mixed condition as a baseline category. Visual inspection of residual 
plots did not reveal any noticeable deviations from assumptions of normality or 
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homoscedasticity. P-values were obtained using a MCMC sampling method (pvals.fnc) 
provided by the languageR package (Baayen, 2008). 
 
 
2.6.4 Hypotheses 
Here we recap and summarise our various hypotheses. 
 
HYPOTHESIS ONE: Participants will increase their communicative success over successive 
blocks and generations. 
 
HYPOTHESIS TWO: Languages in the Mixed condition will consistently evolve towards 
systematic category-marking systems. 
 
HYPOTHESIS THREE: Languages in the Shape-Same condition will consistently evolve 
towards holistic systems. 
 
HYPOTHESIS FOUR: Languages in the Shape-Different condition will consistently evolve 
towards underspecified systems. 
 
HYPOTHESIS FIVE: The degree of signal uncertainty will decrease across all three conditions 
over successive blocks and generations. 
 
HYPOTHESIS SIX: The Shape-Different condition is predicted to show higher levels of 
meaning uncertainty than the Mixed and Shape-Same conditions. 
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HYPOTHESIS SEVEN: The degree of meaning uncertainty in context will decrease across all 
three conditions. 
 
 
3 Results 
 
3.1 Qualitative Results: Languages 
This section will provide an overview of a representative selection of languages observed in 
each of these three conditions. We contrast the initial starting language participants were 
trained on with very early systems at the start (generation 1, block 1 of communicative 
interaction) and at the end (generation 1, interaction block 2) of a single generation, as well as   
systems in the final generation of the chain (generation 3, interaction block 2).  
 
Figure 5 shows an example from chain 1, from the Mixed condition. In generation 1, the 
labels for each individual referent tend to show some individuation: for instance, 
MUWUMUWU is only ever associated with one particular blob. However, even at this early 
stage, we start to see evidence that the labels are patterning systematically according to shape. 
For instance, the initial syllable MU is consistently associated with blob-shaped referents, and 
the template H*PA is associated with star-shaped referents. There is also some 
underspecification: HAPA, for instance, is used with all four stars (albeit at different 
frequencies). Words lengths also appear to differ systematically between shapes (although 
this strategy is not repeated in other chains). At the end of the first generation (block 2) a few 
clear patterns emerge. First, the degree of heterogeneity has decreased in terms of the number 
of unique words and the number of unique syllables. Second, there is a higher degree of 
conventionality for each individual referent, as evident in some labels only ever appearing 
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with one referent (e.g., MUHUMU and HEPA). Lastly, there is less underspecification across 
star-shaped referents –  HAPA is now only associated with two stars. The language of the third 
generation extends these patterns of increased conventionality: each individual referent has a 
unique label that distinguishes it from other referents. Furthermore, these labels show 
systematic relations with one another: three of the blob-shaped images are distinguished from 
one another through varying the length of (partially) reduplicated syllables (MUWU, 
MUWUMU and MUWUMUWU). Meanwhile, all of the star-shaped images persist with the basic 
template of h*pa, and individual referents within this category differ only in the vowel of the 
first syllable. Finally, there is no underspecification by generation 3: as predicted, the 
language marks the basic-level category of shape as well as the individuating element. This 
observation supports our hypothesis that systematic structure will emerge in the Mixed 
condition, with languages first converging on conventionalised forms for shape followed by 
the idiosyncratic features. 
 
[Figure Five goes here] 
 
In the first generation of the Shape-Same condition (Figure 6) we see some commonalities 
with the early stages of the Mixed condition: there are examples of conventionality (e.g., GIGI 
and ZARA) as well as diversity (e.g., the wide range of labels for the blob with antennae and 
the star with dots) in the labels used for the individual referents. By time we reach block 2 of 
the first generation there is almost a completely conventionalised system (in that the 
participants are aligned on a stable set of labels for each referent). Furthermore, unlike the 
Mixed condition, this conventionalised system tends to recycle holistic variants instead of 
introducing systematicity: while there are pockets of systematicity (e.g., KANAKU and 
NAKAKU), these are circumscribed when compared to the Mixed condition. Interestingly, at 
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the third generation, the NAPAWE variant has been favoured over the NAKAKU variant, 
lending additional weight to the notion that the situational context is biasing the system 
AGAINST systematic structure. These observations provide support for our hypothesis that 
holistic languages evolve in the Shape-Same condition. However, we should note 
systematicity is tolerated to a certain extent, as is the case for the blob-shaped images (KAPA 
and KAPAPA and GUGU and GIGI).  
 
[Figure Six goes here] 
 
For the Shape-Different condition (Figure 7), we see that there is a high level of 
heterogeneity in both the labels used between and within the referents. There is, however, 
some clustering of syllable types (e.g., NO, GO, NI etc) and combinatorial patterns (e.g., 
PUGO, GOGO, PUMA) according to the basic-level category of shape. Interestingly, this 
diversity persists in the first generation (block 2), with less conventionality than that found in 
the Mixed and Shape-Same conditions. Still, there is an increase in conventional patterns, 
with forms becoming more predictable over time in both the number of syllables and the way 
in which they are arranged (e.g., ME and HE tend to disproportionately occur in the initial 
syllable position). The most noticeable difference between generation 1 and generation 3 is 
the collapse towards underspecification: we see high frequency forms for all blob-shaped 
referents (e.g., PUGU) and all star-shaped referents (e.g., HEHA). In addition to this loss of 
variation at the word level, variation also decreases at the syllable level (e.g., there are only 
four syllables for blob-shaped images: PU, PO, GU, and GO). The emergence of underspecified 
languages supports our hypothesis that languages in Shape-Same condition will evolve to 
abstract across the meaning dimension of shape. 
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[Figure Seven goes here] 
 
It is important to note that all three conditions started off with a language that consists of 
randomly generated pairings of labels and meanings. Although the individual pairings differ 
between conditions, they do share an important structural characteristics: all initial languages 
have high levels of synonymy (three labels for each meaning). A consistent pattern shared 
across all three conditions is a shift from this system with many-to-one signal-meaning 
mappings to systems where we observe one-to-one and one-to-many mappings.  
 
3.2 Communicative Success 
 
Communicative Success scores tended to follow a similar trajectory in all three conditions 
(see Figure 8). Over successive blocks we observe a clear increase in the overall 
communicative success rate, leading to near-perfect communication by the end of generation 
3. Analysis of the logistic mixed effects model revealed a significant main effect of 
Generation (β = 1.13, SE = 0.19, z = 6.646, p < .001) and Block (β= 1.03, SE = 0.30, z = 
3.399, p < .001), but no effect of Condition and no other significant interactions (p >.074). 
 
[Figure Eight goes here] 
 
These results show that, in all conditions, the languages are becoming increasingly effective 
at achieving communicative success through (a) repeated interactions between individual 
participant pairs and (b) across successive generations of participant pairs. 
 
3.3 Difference Scores 
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Table 1 shows the idealised and observed (in the second block of generation 3) values for the 
within- and between-category difference measures. Figure 9 shows how these measures 
evolve over time. Our hypothesis that languages in the Mixed condition should evolve 
systematic category-marking and should therefore produce a within-category difference score 
of around 0.5 (characteristic of a system in which signals tend to be composed of a general 
category-marker and an individuating element) and a between-category difference score of 1 
(distinctive labels used across categories).  For the Shape-Same condition, we predicted the 
emergence of holistic languages, where each object is associated with a unique and 
distinctive label: this is characterised by high within- and between-category differences. As 
can be seen from Table 1, these predictions were borne out. For the Shape-Different 
condition, we predicted the emergence of systems that underspecified, using a single label for 
all objects sharing a shape, which would correspond to 0 within-category difference and a 
high between-category difference: as can be seen from the table, while this prediction was 
partially supported (within-category difference is lower than between-category difference), 
the within-category difference in this condition remains high – this is due to the slower 
conventionalisation seen in this condition, as highlighted in the qualitative analysis above 
(see also measures of signal uncertainty below). 
 
[Table 1 goes here] 
 
[Figure Nine goes here] 
 
Analysis of the mixed-effects model for Within-Category difference showed a significant 
effect of Generation (β = -0.07, SE = 0.02, t(84) = -2.823, p <.001), and a significant main 
effect of Shape-Same condition (β = 0.20, SE = 0.04, t(84) = 5.043, p <.001). There was one 
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significant interaction for Shape-Same condition x Generation (β = 0.07, SE = 0.03, t(84) = 
2.266, p =.017). All other main effects and associated interactions were non-significant (p 
>.061). These results partially support our predictions: within-category difference remains 
high in the Same-Shape condition, reflecting the development of labels which individuate 
within categories, and decreases in the other conditions; however, the Within-Category 
differences remain surprisingly high in the Shape-Different condition, where we predicted the 
emergence of a fully underspecified system, associated with Within-Category difference of 0. 
 
Analysis of the model for Between-Category difference showed that only the main effect of 
Generation was significant (β = 0.04, SE = 0.02, t(84) = 2.46, p <.001), supporting the 
contention that Between-Category labels become increasingly distinct from one another over 
generations. All other main effects and associated interactions were non-significant (p >.139). 
 
3.4 Conditional Entropy 
3.4.1 Signal Uncertainty H(S|M) 
 
For the conditional entropy of signals given meanings, H(S|M), we observe a general 
decrease across all three conditions (see fig. 10). However, the decline in entropy for the 
Shape-Different condition appears to be less pronounced than that of the Mixed and Shape-
Same conditions: as discussed above, within-category variation persists unexpectedly in this 
condition. For H(S|M) the mixed-effects model contained significant results for the main 
effects of Generation (β = -0.61, SE = 0.13, t(72) = -4.561, p <.001), Block (β = -0.38, SE = 
0.09, t(72) = -4.366, p <.03) and Shape-Different condition (β = 0.62, SE = 0.31, t(72) = 
2.011, p <.009). There were no other significant main effects or interactions (p >.259). 
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[Figure Ten goes here] 
 
3.4.2 Meaning Uncertainty H(M|S) 
 
Figure 11 plots the conditional entropy of meanings given signals, H(M|S), against the 
number of blocks. As predicted, there is a clear difference between the conditions, with the 
Shape-Different condition showing a general increase in entropy in contrast to the Mixed and 
Shape-Same conditions, corresponding to the development of underspecified labels. For 
H(M|S) the mixed-effects model contained significant results for the main effect of the 
Shape-Different condition (β= 0.41, SE = 0.10, t(72) = 4.053, p<.001). There was also a 
significant Shape-Different condition x Block interaction (β = 0.32, SE = 0.09, t(72) = 3.424, 
p <.001). There were no other significant main effects or interactions (p >.265). 
 
[Figure Eleven goes here] 
 
3.4.3 Meaning Uncertainty of signals in context H(M|S,C) 
 
The conditional entropy of meanings given signals in context, H(M|S,C), is shown in figure 
12. In all three conditions we observe a decrease in entropy over time, with each of the 
conditions showing strikingly similar trajectories of change: as indicated by the 
communicative accuracy scores, the languages in all conditions evolve towards allowing 
optimal communication in context. For H(M|S,C) the mixed-effects model contained 
significant results for the main effects of Generation (β = -0.08, SE = 0.03, t(72) = -3.300, p 
<.001) and Block (β = -0.07, SE = 0.01, t(72) = -5.927, p <.001). There were no other 
significant main effects or interactions (p >.078). 
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[Figure Twelve goes here] 
 
4 Discussion 
 
Our findings support the general hypothesis that language structure adapts to the situational 
contexts in which it is learned and used. As we outlined in the introduction, some meaning is 
encoded and some meaning is inferred, with interactional short-term strategies of conveying 
the intended meaning feeding back into long-term, system-wide changes. In our experiment, 
languages gradually evolved to encode information relevant to the task of achieving 
communicative success in context, with different language systems evolving in each 
experimental condition. In the Shape-Same condition, where the dimension of shape was 
always the same for stimuli pairings, holistic systems of communication emerged, whilst in 
the Shape-Different condition, where the dimension of shape was always different for stimuli 
pairings, the system generalised and became underspecified (although unexpectedly variable: 
see discussion below). For the Mixed condition, which featured both Shape-Same and Shape-
Different contexts, the systems that emerged were systematically structured: that is, both 
shape category and individual identity were encoded in the linguistic signal. These divergent 
systems arise given a very simple meaning space, through slight manipulations to the 
situational context. 
 
Despite these inherent differences between the languages that emerged, all of the conditions 
showed: (a) an increased level of communicative success and (b) a reduction in in-context 
meaning uncertainty, H(M|S,C). This observation suggests each condition produces 
languages that are functionally adequate for the task of achieving communicative success in 
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context. The fact that different systems evolve for conveying the same set of meanings is 
important for how we view the role of context. Our explanation rests on the premise that 
languages are adapting to their niche, which in this case comprises the situational context, to 
become optimally structured.   
 
Underspecified systems emerge in the Shape-Different condition because “when context is 
informative, any good communication system will leave out information already in the 
context” (Piantadosi, Tily & Gibson, 2012: 284). This lends weight to studies showing that 
participants are making use of pragmatic reasoning to convey information at the least cost 
given common knowledge and the task at hand (Frank & Goodman, 2012).  These 
underspecified systems could be construed as being highly ambiguous when taken out of 
their communicative context. However, when we take into account the context in which the 
signals were used (as measured by the H(M|S,C)) then the apparent ambiguity is not counter-
functional: that is, the system is perfectly adequate for achieving communicative success. 
When examined out of context, adapted communication systems can give the appearance of 
ambiguity, as Miller (1951: 111-2) noted: “Why do people tolerate such ambiguity? The 
answer is that they do not. There is nothing ambiguous about 'take' as it is used in everyday 
speech. The ambiguity appears only when we, quite arbitrarily, call isolated words the unit of 
meaning.” 
 
While the amount of synonymy (as measured by H(S|M)) decreased over time across all 
conditions, the Shape-Different condition appeared to tolerate a higher level of synonymy 
than the other two conditions. One possible explanation is the way in which participants 
viewed the task. An initially diverse input could be construed as priming the participants to 
reproduce a diverse output. If the labels are easy enough to learn and reproduce, and they 
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achieve the goal of successfully allowing the matcher to choose the correct image, then this 
variation may be tolerated for longer. This also partly explains why the Shape-Different 
condition deviates from its predicted within-category difference score: labels are not 
conventionally associated with any one particular meaning within a category. For instance, as 
discussed in the qualitative analysis (see Fig. 7), PUGU and POGO (which are quite distinct, 
with a normalised Levenshtein edit distance of 0.5) are not conventionally associated with 
any particular blob; instead, they pattern synonymously, with the two labels being optional 
forms for any blob-shaped image. This reflects a limitation of the difference measurement to 
distinguish between systematic languages and this kind of synonymy. However, these 
languages do have distinct profiles, as evidenced by the various entropy measurements.      
 
It is also worth noting that not all chains in the Shape-Different condition converged on an 
underspecified system, with chain 11 evolving a holistic-like system. This mismatch with our 
predictions is perhaps due to the Shape-Different condition having more optionality provided 
by the situational context: that is, any of three hypothesised systems (Underspecified, 
Holistic, Systematic) are expressively adequate for conveying the intended meaning, although 
these systems differ in their parsimony in terms of memory and learning demands. This 
increases the probability that we will see more variation in the types of systems that evolve in 
the Shape-Different condition. Whereas underspecified and, to a lesser extent, systematic 
category-marking languages are communicatively sub-optimal in the Shape-Same condition, 
the Shape-Different condition does not share such restrictions. A similar story applies when 
comparing the Mixed and Shape-Different conditions: neither holistic nor systematic 
category-marking languages are disfavoured for either condition, but an underspecified 
system would be problematic in the Mixed condition (as 43% of the contexts have images 
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that share the same shape). Chain 11 thus serves as an important reminder of lineage-
specificity, and how the historical properties of a particular system can bias future states. 
 
For the Shape-Same condition, the chains consistently converge on holistic systems: that is, 
each individual stimulus has a unique label, with these labels being relatively distinct from 
one another. The decrease in H(S|M) and H(M|S) shows that the system is converging 
towards a one-to-one mapping of forms and meanings, whereas the high within-category 
difference scores show these signals are highly distinct from one another, and indeed more 
distinctive than those found in the other two conditions. Our rationale for the emergence of 
holistic systems in the Shape-Same condition is similar to that of the Shape-Different 
condition: where the situational context is informative, information will be left out of the 
linguistic system. In this instance, the context was informative through virtue of having the 
pairs of stimuli always sharing the same shape. This explains why systematicity is minimised 
in the Shape-Same condition: the linguistic system does not need to conventionally encode 
shape into the signal because context makes it irrelevant in discriminating between meanings. 
Instead, these languages specialise and become holistic, allowing them to meet the 
participants’ communicative needs in context. 
 
Even though the languages which emerge in the Shape-Same condition do reliably differ 
from those that evolve in the Mixed condition, through being more holistic, there is some 
evidence of systematicity in these chains. In chain 6, for instance, a language evolved in 
which two of the blob-shaped stimuli share similar labels (KAPA and KAPAPA) as do the other 
two blob-shaped stimuli (GUGU and GIGI). These pockets of correlations between word forms 
suggest a certain degree of systematicity is tolerated – albeit not to the same extent as that 
found in the Mixed and Shape-Different conditions. One explanation for this finding is that 
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the situational context and communication are not the only factors shaping the system, with 
learnability pressures also acting on the structure of language (Kirby, Cornish & Smith, 
2008). 
 
Only in the Mixed condition do we consistently observe the emergence of systematic 
category-marking languages. The first line of evidence is that the observed within-category 
difference score lines up with our expected score (see Figure 11): this suggests part of the 
label is specifying shape and the other part is specifying the individuating component. While, 
as noted above, a difference score of approximately 0.5 is not necessarily indicative of 
systematic language structure, the H(S|M) and H(M|S) scores show that, by generation 3, the 
languages in the Mixed condition have low conditional entropy, showing that the form-
meaning pairs embody one-to-one mappings. 
 
A holistic language would be just as successful as conveying the correct meaning as a 
systematic language in the Mixed condition. So why do we see the emergence of systematic 
instead of holistic languages? Part of the reason rests on how these languages evolve in the 
early stages of their emergence: participants quickly establish a conventionalised 
specification of shape, before arriving upon conventionalised forms that encode the 
individuating elements. As a strategy, specifying shape information only requires participants 
to align on two signals, one that specifies star-shaped objects and one that specifies blob-
shaped objects, which would allow them to successfully communicate on 57% of trials (those 
where discrimination only requires that shape information is conventionally encoded). 
 
We can view this strategy as a negotiated exploration of the specification space during 
interaction, giving rise to a two-stage process: (i) THE CONVENTIONALISATION OF 
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CATEGORY-MARKING FOR SHAPE; (ii) THE CONVENTIONALISATION OF INDIVIDUATING 
ELEMENTS. Supporting this contention of a two-stage process is the main effect of Generation 
for both the within-category difference scores and the conditional entropy of H(S|M): even 
though the within-category difference scores suggest systematic category-marking emerges 
by the end of generation one, the H(S|M) entropy is much higher in this initial generation 
than it is at later generations. The decrease in H(S|M) reflects the conventionalisation of 
individuating elements in the linguistic system - that is, there is less synonymy in later 
generations.  
 
Another striking finding in the Mixed condition was the rate at which systematic category-
marking emerged, within a single generation of participants. Part of the explanation could be 
in how the manipulation of context exerts a strong constraint for participants to quickly 
converge on conventional markers for shape. There are several reasons why the rapid 
evolution seen in this experiment might prove to be an exception, rather than a general 
tendency. First of all, there are only two possible dimensions that the language may encode: 
the basic-level category and the subordinate idiosyncratic component. There are also 
differences between the initial generation and successive generations (as mentioned above): 
namely, later generations show greater degrees of conventionalisation in their label usage.  
 
If languages are adapting to their contextual niche, then what are the implications for the 
learning bias and historical contingency accounts? Even though our results are broadly 
consistent with the ecologically sensitive account, there is also evidence consistent with the 
learning bias (e.g., pockets of systematicity in the Shape-Same condition and the overall 
reduction of synonymy across all conditions) and historical contingency (e.g., the emergence 
of a holistic language in chain 11 of the Shape-Different condition) accounts. It is likely that 
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all these theoretical perspectives hold true to some extent, with the role of context being 
mediated by partially-competing motivations of prior learning biases and historical 
contingency. Such notions reflect the converging evidence that languages, and the way in 
which they are organised, “are better explained as stable engineering solutions satisfying 
multiple design constraints, reflecting both cultural-historical factors and the constraints of 
human cognition” (Evans & Levinson, 2009: 429).    
 
5 Conclusion 
 
We set out to investigate the role of situational context in the emergence of different types of 
linguistic systems that evolve through iterated learning. By manipulating the ways in which 
stimuli were paired with one another, we showed that situational context is an important 
factor is determining what is and is not encoded in the linguistic system. Our results offer a 
potential insight into how the situational context can bias the cultural evolution of language. 
The type and predictability of the situational contexts relate to how language users will 
employ certain communicative strategies for conveying the intended meaning, with the 
resulting language systems reflecting the contextual constraints in which they evolved. 
 
One of the major findings in our experiment is that the types of linguistic systems that evolve 
are highly predictable based on their contextual constraints during communication. This 
interplay between short-term linguistic strategies for resolving communicative interactions, 
and the implication for language systems through long-term patterns of change, speaks to 
real-world processes such as grammaticalisation: the types of change we observe in 
languages show predictable patterns, as evident in the unidirectionality hypothesis (cf. 
Hopper & Traugott, 2003), but importantly these changes show how contextual constraints on 
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the moment-to-moment communicative strategies deployed can have widespread 
ramifications on whole linguistic systems (Steels, 2012). Natural languages are subject to a 
larger and more diverse range of contexts, with a key future question being the extent to 
which our experimental results are generalisable to patterns observed in natural language 
systems. 
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Table One 
 
Condition 
 
Within-Category Difference Between-Category Difference 
Idealised Observed Idealised Observed 
Shape-Same 1 0.74 (SD = .05) 1  0.80 (SD = .07) 
Mixed 0.5 0.47 (SD = .07) 1 0.88 (SD = .05) 
Shape-Different 0 0.62 (SD = .10) 1 0.90 (SD = .08) 
 
Table 1. The idealised (left-hand columns) and observed (right-hand columns) scores for 
within-category differences and between-category differences.  Numbers in brackets indicate 
the bootstrapped standard deviation. 
 
Figure One 
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Figure 1. Language strategies and example contexts. The green coloured boxes correspond to 
the intended referent. As we can see, DOG is a viable strategy for conveying the intended 
meaning in context A, but we need to either use a more specific label (DALMATIAN) or 
provide additional referential information alongside the generalised form (SPOTTED DOG) to 
convey the intended meaning in context B. 
 
 
Figure Two 
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Figure 2. All eight meanings for the image stimulus set used in this experiment. Note that 
each individual image is comprised of two components: a basic-level of shape (star or blob) 
and a subordinate-level (a unique idiosyncratic feature). 
 
Figure Three 
52 | P a g e  
 
 
53 | P a g e  
 
Figure 3. 3A is an example of a pairing in the Shape-Same condition: here, participants only 
ever observe pairings that share the same shape. 3B is an example of a pairing found in the 
Shape-Different condition; the two stimuli always differ in shape. 3C shows an example of 
the pairings used in the Mixed condition: here, we get a mixture of stimuli that in some 
contexts differ in shape and in other contexts share the same shape. 
 
 
Figure Four 
 
Figure 4. An example of the random selection process employed for a single meaning in the 
Shape-Same condition. Here, one target meaning is associated with 6 (possibly unique) 
signals during communicative testing. However, only three trials are required to construct a 
training block for the next generation: in order to generate this training block, we sample 
randomly from the appropriate contexts.  
 
Figure Five 
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Figure 5. A table showing the initial training language and all of the signal-meaning pairs 
produced at generation 1 (communication block 1), generation 1 (communication block 2) 
and generation 3 (communication block 2) in chain 1 (Mixed condition). Each meaning 
appears with a collection of labels beneath it: this constitutes the combined output of a pair of 
participants in a particular generation. 
 
Figure Six 
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Figure 6. A table showing the initial training language and all of the signal-meaning pairs 
produced at generation 1 (communication block 1), generation 1 (communication block 2) 
and generation 3 (communication block 2) in chain 6 (Shape-Same condition). 
 
Figure Seven 
56 | P a g e  
 
 
Figure 7. A table showing the initial training language and all of the signal-meaning pairs 
produced at generation 1 (communication block 1), generation 1 (communication block 2) 
and generation 3 (communication block 2) in chain 12 (Shape-Different condition). 
Highlighted labels show underspecification. 
 
Figure Eight 
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Figure 8. Average communicative success scores by generation (1-3), communication block, 
and condition. The vertical dotted lines represent the start of the next generation. Error bars 
represent the 95% confidence intervals.  
 
Figure Nine 
 
Figure 9. Between-category (solid lines) and within-category (dotted lines) difference scores 
(measured by the average normalised Levenshtein edit distance) over successive 
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communication blocks for the Mixed (blue lines), Shape-Same (green lines) and Shape-
Different conditions (red lines). Generation 0 gives values for the initial random language. 
Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Figure Ten 
 
Figure 10. Degree of signal uncertainty, measured as H(S|M), against Generation and Block. 
Higher entropy scores indicate a higher degree of signal uncertainty. The error bars indicate 
the 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Figure Eleven 
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Figure 11. Degree of meaning uncertainty, measured as H(M|S).  
 
Figure Twelve 
 
 
Figure 12. Meaning uncertainty of signals in context, measured as H(M|S,C). 
 
 
